Book of Authorities

"The Law is Always Speaking" - Interpretation Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21), s. 10

This page details an incomplete list of relevant rules, legislation, and precedents in law that Citizens rely on as a guardrail. Paired with the corresponding event chronology and evidence, these citations accentuate the gravity of the scandal. Regulators turned a blind eye. Whistleblower intervention is required.

Primacy and Supremacy of the Constitution in All Matters

Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 52(1): The Supremacy Clause;

"The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect."

What does "law" cover? Per the Interpretation Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-21), section 2(1);

Enact includes to issue, make or establish;

Enactment means an Act or Regulation or any portion of an Act or Regulation;

Public Officer includes any person in the federal public administration who is authorized by or under an Enactment to do or enforce the doing of an act or thing or to exercise a power, or on whom a duty is imposed by or under an Enactment;

Regulation includes an Order, Regulation, Rule, Rule of Court, Form, Tariff of costs or fees, Letters patent, Commission, Warrant, Proclamation, By-law, Resolution or other instrument issued, made or established;

(a) in the execution of a power conferred by or under the authority of an Act, or
(b) by or under the authority of the Governor in Council;

Repeal includes revoke or cancel.

Per section 10; The law shall be considered as always speaking, and where a matter or thing is expressed in the present tense, it shall be applied to the circumstances as they arise, so that effect may be given to the Enactment according to its true spirit, intent and meaning.

Section 52(1) recognizes the primacy of the Constitution (Ontario Attorney General v. G., 2020 SCC 38 at paragraph 89). It imposes an obligation on bodies empowered to determine questions of law to do so in a manner consistent with the Constitution and to invalidate or treat as invalid a law to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution (Mossop v. Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 at page 582; Nova Scotia (Workers Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 at paragraph 28).

Any accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend against a criminal charge on the basis that the applicable prohibition is unconstitutional even if the accused’s own Charter rights or freedoms are not at stake. The rationale is that no one shall be convicted under an unconstitutional law (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at pages 313-14).

Section 24(1) covers state-sponsored crimes and unconstitutional effects. Per Nova Scotia Teachers Union v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2023 NSCA 82 at paragraph 7;

“In considering the remedial scheme established by the Charter, it is important to distinguish between legislation which is found to be unconstitutional and government conduct that infringes Charter rights. For the former, the remedy is typically a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act. For government actions that infringe Charter rights, s. 24(1) will provide the remedy. In R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, the Supreme Court of Canada discusses the distinction between remedies for unconstitutional legislation and those for unconstitutional government conduct: When a law produces an unconstitutional effect, the usual remedy lies under s. 52(1), which provides that the law is of no force or effect to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Charter. A law may be inconsistent with the Charter either because of its purpose or its effect: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985]1 S.C.R. 295; R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713. Section 52 does not create a personal remedy. A claimant who otherwise has standing can generally seek a declaration of invalidity under s. 52 on the grounds that a law has unconstitutional effects either in his own case or on third parties: Big M; see also Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: Myth or Reality?” (1999‑2000), 11 N.J.C.L. 411, at pp. 432‑34; Morris Rosenberg and Stéphane Perrault, “Ifs and Buts in Charter Adjudication: The Unruly Emergence of Constitutional Exemptions in Canada” (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 375, at pp. 380‑82. The jurisprudence affirming s. 52(1) as the appropriate remedy for laws that produce unconstitutional effects is based on the language chosen by the framers of the Charter: see Sankoff, at p. 438. Section 24(1), by contrast, is generally used as a remedy, not for unconstitutional laws, but for unconstitutional government acts committed under the authority of legal regimes which are accepted as fully constitutional: see Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624; Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6. The acts of government agents acting under such regimes are not the necessary result or “effect” of the law, but of the government agent’s applying a discretion conferred by the law in an unconstitutional manner. Section 52(1) is thus not applicable. The appropriate remedy lies under s. 24(1).”

Application of Constitutional Rights in Legal Proceedings

In accordance with the foregoing, jurisprudence has underscored the applicability of Constitutional law in legal matters. The Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") held in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at paragraph 38;

“As has been noted above, it is difficult and probably dangerous to attempt to define with narrow precision that element of governmental intervention which will suffice to permit reliance on the Charter by private litigants in private litigation.”

The same principle is applicable to rules, as contemplated in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at paragraph 85;

“Where the principles underlying a common law rule are out of step with the values enshrined in the Charter, the courts should scrutinize the rule closely. If it is possible to change the common law rule so as to make it consistent with Charter values, without upsetting the proper balance between judicial and legislative action that I have referred to above, then the rule ought to be changed.”

“If a legislative provision can be read both in a way that is constitutional and in a way that is not, the former reading should be adopted.” (R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at paragraph 33 (and cases cited therein); see also generally: Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610).

Likewise, section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights prevents obstructions in justice which might be occasioned through technical encumbrances and misconstrued law;

“Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to (e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations.”

The SCC in Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at paragraph 85 held;

"The Canadian Bill of Rights retains all its force and effect, together with the various provincial charters of rights. Because these constitutional or quasi‑constitutional instruments are drafted differently, they are susceptible of producing cumulative effects for the better protection of rights and freedoms."

Likewise concerning the Bill of Rights, the SCC held in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, 2003 SCC 39 at paragraphs 32, 34, and 40;

“Where federal legislation conflicts with the protections of the Bill of Rights, unless the conflicting legislation expressly declares that it operates notwithstanding the Bill of Rights as required by s. 2, the Bill of Rights applies and the legislation is inoperative; R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 (the s. 1(b) equality guarantee of the Bill of Rights rendered inoperative a provision of the Indian Act which made it an offence for a status Indian to be intoxicated off a reserve). [...] “With the constitutional amendment and the adoption of the Charter in 1982, many of the protections of the Bill of Rights gained constitutional status. The Bill of Rights, however, provides two protections not expressly available in the Charter. Section 1(a) protects the enjoyment of property, the deprivation of which must occur through the due process of law. Section 2(e) guarantees a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of rights and obligations.” [...] The Bill of Rights purports to guide the proper interpretation of every “law of Canada”, which s. 5 of the Bill of Rights defines to mean “an Act of the Parliament of Canada enacted before or after the coming into force of this Act” (emphasis added)."

In a recent matter, Canada (Attorney General) v. Power, 2024 SCC 26, the SCC reinforced the primacy of the Constitution in all matters at paragraphs 26, 30, 34, 35, 41, 54, 55, and 56;

"The Charter must be given a generous and expansive interpretation; not a narrow, technical or legalistic one (Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 156). Charter provisions must be “interpreted in a broad and purposive manner and placed in their proper linguistic, philosophic, and historical contexts” (Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, at para. 25)."
[...] "Clearly, the federal and provincial legislatures are subject to Charter scrutiny. As this Court has explained, the words of s. 32(1) express that “the Charter is essentially an instrument for checking the powers of government over the individual” (McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, at p. 261). The Charter “is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms” (Hunter, at p. 156). As explained further below, ss. 32(1) and 24 of the Charter, along with s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, entrench the court’s role in holding the government to account for Charter violations (M. L. Pilkington, “Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1984), 62 Can. Bar Rev. 517, at pp. 535 and 552-67)."
[...] "A declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) is the “first and most important remedy” when dealing with unconstitutional legislation (Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, at para. 1). Section 52(1) establishes the supremacy of the Constitution and empowers courts to declare legislation “of no force or effect” in part or in full. This remedy allows courts to protect Charter rights while respecting the distinct role of the legislature in our constitutional order (Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at p. 715; Ontario (Attorney General) v. G, 2020 SCC 38, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 629, at paras. 84-99). "
[...] "Section 24(1) provides that anyone whose Charter rights or freedoms have been infringed or denied may apply for “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”."
[...] "An award of damages against the state for exceeding its legal powers has long been recognized as an important requirement of the rule of law (K. Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), at § 11:1, citing Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121; see also W. H. Charles, Understanding Charter Damages: The Judicial Evolution of a Charter Remedy (2016))."
[...] "The rule of law is “a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure” (Roncarelli, at p. 142) and is “clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution” (Reference re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at p. 750). It protects “individuals from arbitrary state action” by providing “that the law is supreme over the acts of both government and private persons” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, at paras. 70-71)"
[...] "The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada. The principle of constitutionalism finds clear expression in s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Thus, “with the adoption of the Charter, the Canadian system of government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, at para. 72; see also Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at paras. 105-6; C. Mathen and P. Macklem, eds., Canadian Constitutional Law (6th ed. 2022), at pp. 16-1 and 1275; L. E. Weinrib, “Of diligence and dice: Reconstituting Canada’s Constitution” (1992), 42 U.T.L.J. 207; K. Roach, “The Separation and Interconnection of Powers in Canada: The Role of Courts, the Executive and the Legislature in Crafting Constitutional Remedies” (2018), 5 J.I.C.L. 315)."

[...] "These principles “lie at the root of our system of government” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, at para. 70). Together, they explain the duty that courts have “to act as vigilant guardians of constitutional rights and the rule of law” (Doucet-Boudreau, at para. 110). Thus, courts play a fundamental role in holding the executive and legislative branches of government to account in Canada’s constitutional order."

Bottom line: Influential parties and stakeholders, including those in the public sector, cannot weaponize adjudicative institutions in their favor at the expense of a Citizen's Constitutional rights, and moreover, courts and police agencies cannot allow them to.

The Constitution Protects Canadian Citizens Against State-Sponsored Influence and/or Interference in the Lives of Citizens and in Legal Matters, and Provides a Low Threshold for Investigative Relief

The SCC has outlined test criteria concerning the likelihood of state interference in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 (CanLII), [2013] 3 SCR 1101. Per the Chief Justice at paragraph 76;

“A sufficient causal connection standard is satisfied by a reasonable inference, drawn on a balance of probabilities (Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, at para. 21.”

Likewise, the SCC in Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 has promulgated a test concerning a balance of probabilities at paragraph 21;

“An applicant for a Charter remedy must prove a Charter violation on a balance of probabilities (R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 277). It is reasonable to infer from the uncontradicted evidence before us that the statements taken by Canadian officials are contributing to the continued detention of Mr. Khadr, thereby impacting his liberty and security interests.”

In the matter of Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII), [2007] 1 SCR 350, the SCC has maintained that national security, political, and/or state-sponsored third-party interests cannot be used to excuse procedures that do not conform to fundamental justice at the section 7 stage of (Charter) analysis, as it has throughout this scandal. Delivered by the Chief Justice, the SCC in Charkaoui wrote at paragraphs 22, 23, and 27;

“The question at the s. 7 stage is whether the principles of fundamental justice relevant to the case have been observed in substance, having regard to the context and the seriousness of the violation. The issue is whether the process is fundamentally unfair to the affected person. If so, the deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person simply does not conform to the requirements of s. 7. The inquiry then shifts to s. 1 of the Charter, at which point the government has an opportunity to establish that the flawed process is nevertheless justified having regard, notably, to the public interest.” [...] “It follows that while administrative constraints associated with the context of national security may inform the analysis on whether a particular process is fundamentally unfair, security concerns cannot be used to excuse procedures that do not conform to fundamental justice at the s. 7 stage of the analysis. If the context makes it impossible to adhere to the principles of fundamental justice in their usual form, adequate substitutes may be found. But the principles must be respected to pass the hurdle of s. 7. That is the bottom line.” [...] “The procedures required to conform to the principles of fundamental justice must reflect the exigencies of the security context. Yet they cannot be permitted to erode the essence of s. 7. The principles of fundamental justice cannot be reduced to the point where they cease to provide the protection of due process that lies at the heart of s. 7 of the Charter. The protection may not be as complete as in a case where national security constraints do not operate. But to satisfy s. 7, meaningful and substantial protection there must be.”

Ongoing criminal mischief and harassment related to the Respondents in the scandal this website details meets the threshold of a Section 7 Charter violation as exemplified in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), 1999 CanLII 653 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 46. Lamer C.J. writes at paragraphs 58, 59;

“This Court has held on a number of occasions that the right to security of the person protects “both the physical and psychological integrity of the individual”: see R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 173 (per Wilson J.); Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 1990 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at p. 1177; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at pp. 587-88. Although these cases considered the right to security of the person in a criminal law context, I believe that the protection accorded by this right extends beyond the criminal law [...] Delineating the boundaries protecting the individual’s psychological integrity from state interference is an inexact science. Dickson C.J. in Morgentaler, supra, at p. 56, suggested that security of the person would be restricted through “serious state-imposed psychological stress."

Precedent Against Piecemeal Justice ("Litigation in Slices")

Standards Concerning Police Obligations & Duties

Accountability Concerning Bias & Negligence in Adjudicative Institutions

Jurisprudence has emphasized exceptional caution in dealing with interrelated subject matter, as the preclusion of related matters may occasion the abuse of process and obstruct justice. Per Groberman, J. in Coast Foundation v. Currie, 2003 BCSC 1781 at paragraphs 13 and 15;

“The question of when the court ought to give judgment on an issue, as opposed to on the claim generally, is more complex. The court is justifiably reluctant to decide cases in a piecemeal fashion. In addition to all of the concerns that arise when the entire claim is before the court, there is a multitude of others. The result is that the court must exercise considerable caution before coming to the conclusion that it should grant judgment on an issue in a summary trial [...] The court must also be wary of making determinations on particular issues on a Rule 18A application when those issues are inexorably intertwined with other issues that are to be left for determination at trial: Prevost v. Vetter, 2002 BCCA 202, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 649; inter-relatedness of issues is not always obvious, and caution is necessary whenever a party seeks judgment on an issue as opposed to judgment generally under Rule 18A: B.M.P. Global et al v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2003 BCCA 534, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2383”

This scandal concerns criminal mischief which law enforcement has consistently refused to investigate by way of negligence and false reports (see Q/A page). These same palpable acts of negligence were likewise dismissed by regulators. The criminal mischief in this scandal began prior to the filing of S-220956, and had informed its creation and timing in the absense of help from the RCMP. Similarly, law enforcement agencies have refused to enforce criminal violations germane to section 139 as they relate to obstruction of justice in legal proceedings affected by public sector employees (ie., by registry agents and Registrars), which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Canadian Judicial Council. R. v. Beaudry, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2007 SCC 5 details a legal test for police duties at paragraph 35;

“There is no question that police officers have a duty to enforce the law and investigate crimes. The principle that the police have a duty to enforce the criminal law is well established at common law: R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.), per Lord Denning, M.R., at p. 769; Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [1988] 2 All E.R. 238 (H.L.), per Lord Keith of Kinkel; P. Ceyssens, Legal Aspects of Policing (loose‑leaf ed.), vol. 1, at pp. 2‑22 et seq.”

How should the same mandate be interpreted? An exceptionally low threshold is applied to the overarching policing mandate. An oft-cited example is cited in 495793 Ontario Ltd. (Central Auto Parts) v. Barclay, 2016 ONCA 656 (CanLII). Juriansz J.A. states at paragraph 51;

“The function of police is to investigate incidents which might be criminal, make a conscientious and informed decision as to whether charges should be laid and present the full facts to the prosecutor: Wong, at para. 56. Although this requires, to some extent, the weighing of evidence in the course of investigation, police are not required to evaluate the evidence to a legal standard or make legal judgments. That is the task of prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges: Hill, at para. 50.”

Juriansz J.A. elaborates at paragraph 52;

“Nor is a police officer required to exhaust all possible routes of investigation or inquiry, interview all potential witnesses prior to arrest, or to obtain the suspect’s version of events or otherwise establish there is no valid defense before being able to form reasonable and probable grounds: Kellman v. Iverson, 2012 ONSC 3244 (CanLII), [2012] O.J. No. 2529, at para. 16; Wong, at para. 59.”

The SCC has underscored the critical importance of diligence in police investigations. McLachlin C.J. states in paragraph 1 of Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41 (“Hill”);

“The police must investigate crime. That is their duty. In the vast majority of cases, they carry out this duty with diligence and care. Occasionally, however, mistakes are made. These mistakes may have drastic consequences.”

The threshold for reasonable grounds is quite low, as is shown in Hill @ paragraph 58;

"The lack of evidence of a chilling effect despite numerous studies is sufficient to dispose of the suggestion that recognition of a tort duty would motivate prudent officers not to proceed with investigations “except in cases where the evidence is overwhelming” (Charron J., at para. 152). This lack of evidence should not surprise us, given the nature of the tort. All the tort of negligent investigation requires is that the police act reasonably in the circumstances. It is reasonable for a police officer to investigate in the absence of overwhelming evidence — indeed evidence usually becomes overwhelming only by the process of investigation. Police officers can investigate on whatever basis and in whatever circumstances they choose, provided they act reasonably. The police need not let all but clearly impaired drivers go to avoid the risk of litigation, as my colleague suggests. They need only act reasonably. They may arrest or demand a breath sample if they have reasonable and probable grounds. And where such grounds are absent, they may have recourse to statutorily authorized roadside tests and screening."

Paragraphs 44 and 140 in Hill further underscore the public interest;

“The effective and responsible investigation of crime is one of the basic duties of the state, which cannot be abdicated. [...] The enforcement of the criminal law is one of the most important aspects of the maintenance of law and order in a free society. Police officers are the main actors who have been entrusted to fulfill this important function.”

The SCC in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), 1999 CanLII 653 (SCC), [1999] 3 SCR 46 upheld Charter rights irrespective of the civil / criminal / family distinctions. In other words, the police agencies cannot deny their obligation to investigate criminal activities closely related to a civil legal proceeding. Per the SCC in New Brunswick at paragraph 58;

"Although these cases considered the right to security of the person in a criminal law context, I believe that the protection accorded by this right extends beyond the criminal law.”

In further modalities concerning negligence, the SCC held in R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 at paragraph 60;

"For the police to lie or deliberately mislead individuals with respect to their Charter rights is fundamentally unfair and demeaning of those Charter rights”. To countenance such government conduct would likely bring the administration of justice into disrepute (R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 at paragraph 60)"

The Supreme Court of Canada underscored the public interest in the correct conduct of law enforcement agencies in Hill, Supra, at paragraph 36. Per McLachlin C.J.;

"The personal interest of the suspect in the conduct of the investigation is enhanced by a public interest. Recognizing an action for negligent police investigation may assist in responding to failures of the justice system, such as wrongful convictions or institutional racism. The unfortunate reality is that negligent policing has now been recognized as a significant contributing factor to wrongful convictions in Canada. While the vast majority of police officers perform their duties carefully and reasonably, the record shows that wrongful convictions traceable to faulty police investigations occur. Even one wrongful conviction is too many, and Canada has had more than one. Police conduct that is not malicious, not deliberate, but merely fails to comply with standards of reasonableness can be a significant cause of wrongful convictions. (See the Honourable Peter Cory, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation (2001), at p. 10 (“Cory Report”); the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer, The Lamer Commission of Inquiry into the Proceedings Pertaining to: Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons and Randy Druken: Report and Annexes (2006), at p. 71; Federal/Provincial/Territorial Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working Group, Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice (2004); the Honourable Fred Kaufman, The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin: Report (1998), at pp. 25-26, 30-31, 34-36, 1095-96, 1098-99, 1101 and 1124.)"

Finally, the SCC held that the state should accept responsibility for miscarriage due in part to errors and/or negligence in investigation. Per McLachlin C.J. in Hill, Supra, at paragraph 37;

‘As Peter Cory points out, at pp. 101 and 103: If the State commits significant errors in the course of the investigation and prosecution, it should accept the responsibility for the sad consequences. Society needs protection from both the deliberate and the careless acts of omission and commission which lead to wrongful conviction and prison.”

The SCC has addressed matters of police negligence by way of bias. The same may be applied to bias with respect to favoritism, ideological bias, or undue third-party influence, so long as the police duty itself is impaired. In R. v. Beaudry, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2007 SCC 5 (“Beaudry”), Charron J. writes at paragraph 1;

“The appellant police officer, Alain Beaudry, is charged with obstructing justice under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46. It is alleged that he deliberately failed to gather the evidence needed to lay criminal charges against a suspect who he had reasonable grounds to believe had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. In answer to the charge, Mr. Beaudry contended that his decision was a proper exercise of police discretion. The Crown argued that the decision was founded not on police discretion, but on preferential treatment of a fellow police officer. Mr. Beaudry was tried by a judge sitting alone and was convicted.”

Charron J. outlines the test in Beaudry at para 16;

“According to Judge Beaulieu, when a peace officer claims to have exercised his or her discretion as in the present case, the court must determine the underlying intention of the exercise of the discretion in order to ascertain whether the peace officer exercised it honestly, and not arbitrarily, out of favoritism or with any other dishonest intention. He therefore concluded that the outcome of the trial turned entirely on whether the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Alain Beaudry had decided not to have Mr. Plourde take a breathalyzer test because Mr. Plourde was a Sûreté du Québec officer. In short, if Sergeant Beaudry was lenient because Mr. Plourde was a peace officer, the exercise of his discretion was unacceptable.”

The SCC has likewise treated matters concerning bias in adjudicative institutions, where lower courts fell short of standards provisioned by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Gonthier J. writes in the preface of J.R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 and subsequently in the decision to allow the appeal;

“The respondents were charged with various infractions of municipal regulations and of the Highway Safety Code. They brought motions for evocation, certiorari and prohibition before the Superior Court, alleging that certain provisions of the Cities and Towns Act and the Municipal Courts Act violated their right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed under s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 23 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. The Superior Court found that the municipal court system failed to meet the standards of judicial independence and impartiality under both Charters and granted the motions.”

This court recognized an overarching concern in the efficacy of Charter rights, to which Canadian courts and police agencies are established to uphold. Gonthier J. continues;

“If a judicial system loses the respect of the public, it has lost its efficacy. As Proulx J.A. expressed in his judgment below, public confidence in the system of justice is crucial to its continued existence and proper functioning (at pp. 61-62): [TRANSLATION] Other values contribute to maintaining public confidence, such as the most democratic access to justice, equality before the law, the independence and professionalism of the Bar, a hearing within a reasonable time, to only name a few. Throughout the course of a trial and at the time judgment is rendered, the parties to a case know that while the tribunal will have to decide in favor of one and to the disappointment of the other, they ultimately accept this because he or she who has the responsibility for deciding has nothing to gain by finding in favor of one party rather than the other and also because his decision is rendered freely and according to his conscience. Therefore, I conclude that the issue in this appeal should be characterized as one of "institutional impartiality".”

In Lippé, this court further characterizes its legal test for bias as being predicated on sound logical inferences;

“If the Canadian Charter does not guarantee "ideal" institutional impartiality, what is the test for determining when there is an infringement? The parties agree that the test for both "independence" and "impartiality" should be that set out by de Grandpré J. in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, a test adopted in Valente, supra, as applicable to both the issue of independence and impartiality (at p. 684, citing de Grandpré J. and at p. 689): The apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically -- and having thought the matter through -- conclude".”

The SCC has likewise recognized logical inferences based on circumstantial facts as an appropriate test in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 @ paragraphs 97-98, whereas, an inference need not be shown to be likely, but must be more than negligible, fanciful, or speculative.

Finally, as delivered by the Chief Justice in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 @ para 391, the seriousness of proper disposition in our institutions invites an exceptionally low threshold to police any manner of misconduct. This decision is not recent, but the fundamentals governing our democracy and its enforcement mechanisms remain constant, and likewise, our rights under the Charter;

“This Court in fixing on the test of reasonable apprehension of bias, as in Ghirardosi v. Minister of Highways for British Columbia, and again in Blanchette v. C.I.S. Ltd., (where Pigeon J. said at p. 842-43, that “a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not act in an entirely impartial manner is ground for disqualification”) was merely restating what Rand J. said in Szilard v. Szasz, at pp. 6-7 in speaking of the “probability or reasoned suspicion of biased appraisal and judgment, unintended though it be”. This test is grounded in a firm concern that there be no lack of public confidence in the impartiality of adjudicative agencies, and I think that emphasis is lent to this concern in the present case by the fact that the National Energy Board is enjoined to have regard for the public interest. For these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the question submitted to the Federal Court of Appeal is answered in the affirmative.”

What are the Tests for Reasonable Grounds and Order of Mandamus?

Given their importance to the scandal, legal tests concerning reasonable grounds for police response have their very own web page; https://www.refugeecanada.net/review. Click the link HERE. You will find that the tests for reasonable grounds are quite low, whereas they are in fact lower than the balance of probabilities required in civil matters. Almost four years in, local and national police refuse to address a clear account of state-sponsored transnational crime, despite the applicable tests being satisfied in good measure.

An Order of Mandamus is required when agencies in the public service fail to do something important that they are required to do, such as respond to and investigate criminal activities. The standard test for Mandamus is promulgated in Canada (Health) v. The Winning Combination Inc., 2017 FCA 101 at paragraph 60 as follows;

"This Court in Apotex, and more recently in Lukacs v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2016 FCA 202, at para. 29, set out criteria to guide the issuance of a mandamus order:
(1) there must be a legal duty to act;

(2) the duty must be owed to the applicant;

(3) there must be a clear right to performance of that duty;

(4) where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, certain additional principles apply;

(5) no adequate remedy is available to the applicant;

(6) the order sought will have some practical value or effect;

(7) the Court finds no equitable bar to the relief sought; and

(8) on a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued."

A Citizen's Constitutional Right to Fundamental Justice & Fair Hearings

The SCC recognized a Citizen's Constitutional right to hearings before independent and impartial courts in Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267 at paragraph 38;

“It should be mentioned at the outset that the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is an integral part of the principles of fundamental justice protected by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter (see, inter alia, R. v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 869, and R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259).”

Mr. Dempsey was jeopardized through acts of negligence in fiduciary legal counsel in the initial CAGE shareholder dispute (see Litigation page), and could not obtain new counsel thereafter, either through private firms or ProBono thereafter. This is attributed to the content detailed in the Zersetzung and Zersetzung Guide pages. The SCC in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paragraphs 73 through 75 and 119 recognized a constitutional right to present one’s case effectively;

New Brunswick at paragraph 73: “For the hearing to be fair, the parent must have an opportunity to present his or her case effectively.”

New Brunswick at paragraph 74: “If no legal aid is available, as in this case, the parent is forced to participate in the proceedings without the benefit of counsel. The majority of the Court of Appeal nevertheless held that the procedural rights provided by the Family Services Act, if complied with, would have been sufficient to “ensure reasonable compliance with constitutional standards” (p. 98).”

New Brunswick at paragraph 75: “In the circumstances of this case, the appellant’s right to a fair hearing required that she be represented by counsel. I have reached this conclusion through a consideration of the following factors: the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings, and the capacities of the appellant. I will consider each in turn.”

New Brunswick at paragraph 119: “It is the obligation of the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion in determining when a lack of counsel will interfere with the ability of the parent to present his or her case. I also agree with him that this discretion was not properly exercised here. The trial judge was in error in not adequately considering the values of meaningful participation in the hearing affecting the rights of the child or the complexity of this case and the difficulty the appellant would face in presenting her case.”

Mr. Dempsey’s opportunity to be heard on all relevant evidence, and right to a decision on the facts and the law has been denied throughout this scandal. Compelling evidence has been simply ignored and pushed aside, despite initial acknowledgements by both the court and law enforcement officers. The same triggers attention under CCC 139. The SCC held in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, 2007 SCC 9 at paragraph 29;

“This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. It requires that the hearing be before an independent and impartial magistrate. It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. And it entails the right to know the case put against one, and the right to answer that case. Precisely how these requirements are met will vary with the context. But for s. 7 to be satisfied, each of them must be met in substance.”

At paragraph 48 in Charkaoui;

“To comply with s. 7 of the Charter, the magistrate must make a decision based on the facts and the law. In the extradition context, the principles of fundamental justice have been held to require, “at a minimum, a meaningful judicial assessment of the case on the basis of the evidence and the law. A judge considers the respective rights of the litigants or parties and makes findings of fact on the basis of evidence and applies the law to those findings. Both facts and law must be considered for a true adjudication. Since Bonham’s Case [(1610), 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 E.R. 646], the essence of a judicial hearing has been the treatment of facts revealed by the evidence in consideration of the substantive rights of the parties as set down by law” (Ferras, at para. 25). The individual and societal interests at stake in the certificate of inadmissibility context suggest similar requirements.”

Likewise at paragraph 41 in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat, 2014:

“Pursuant to the principles of fundamental justice, a named person must be provided with a fair process: Charkaoui I, at paras. 19-20. At issue in the present appeal are two interrelated aspects of the right to a fair process: the right to know and meet the case, and the right to have a decision made by the judge on the facts and the law. The named person must “be informed of the case against him or her, and be permitted to respond to that case”: Charkaoui I, at para. 53. Correlatively, the named person’s knowledge of the case and participation in the process must be sufficient to result in the designated judge being “exposed to the whole factual picture” of the case and having the ability to apply the relevant law to those facts: ibid., at para. 51.”

Mr. Dempsey was denied the right to written reasons that articulate and rationally sustain an administrative decision on a number of occasions over the past two years (Suresh, supra, at paragraph 126), whereas one occasion the judge suggested a trial of the common issues is antagonistic to Canada’s political interest and may "cause social unrest".

Mr. Dempsey was denied the right to protection against abuse of process (United States of America v. Cobb, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587, 2001 SCC 19). This court wrote at paragraph 52;

“By placing undue pressure on Canadian citizens to forego due legal process in Canada, the foreign State has disentitled itself from pursuing its recourse before the courts and attempting to show why extradition should legally proceed. The intimidation bore directly upon the very proceedings before the extradition judge, thus engaging the appellants’ right to fundamental justice at common law, under the doctrine of abuse of process, and as also reflected in s. 7 of the Charter. The extradition judge did not need to await a ministerial decision in the circumstances, as the breach of the principles of fundamental justice was directly and inextricably tied to the committal hearing.”

Further, at paragraph 53 in Cobb;

“In my view, the extradition judge had the jurisdiction to control the integrity of the proceedings before him, and to grant a remedy, both at common law and under the Charter, for abuse of process. He was also correct in concluding as he did that this was one of the clearest of cases where to proceed further with the extradition hearing would violate “those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency” (Keyowski, supra, at pp. 658-59), since the Requesting State in the proceedings, represented by the Attorney General of Canada, had not repudiated the statements of some of its officials that an unconscionable price would be paid by the appellants for having insisted on exercising their rights under Canadian law.”

How do Courts Define Miscarriage of Justice?

R. v. Wolkins, 2005 NSCA 2, 229 N.S.R. (2d) 222, at paragraph 89 held that "there is no strict formula to determine if a miscarriage of justice has occurred", and predicates the same test on the objectively reasonable apprehension of an unbiased person whose confidence is shaken as a result of a judicial order, or through an act or omission by an adjudicative agent, including police.

Specifically, the SCC quoted the same matter in R. v. Davey, 2012 SCC 75, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828 at paragraph 51 as follows;

"In R. v. Wolkins, 2005 NSCA 2, 229 N.S.R. (2d) 222, at para. 89, Cromwell J.A. provided a helpful summary of the two types of unfairness contemplated within the meaning of miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii):

. . . the courts have generally grouped miscarriages of justice under two headings. The first is concerned with whether the trial was fair in fact. A conviction entered after an unfair trial is in general a miscarriage of justice . . . . The second is concerned with the integrity of the administration of justice. A miscarriage of justice may be found where anything happens in the course of a trial, including the appearance of unfairness, which is so serious that it shakes public confidence in the administration of justice . . . . [Citations omitted.]"

The jurisprudence maintains that public confidence is shaken by an appearance of unfairness (R. v. Cameron (1991), 1991 CanLII 7182 (ON CA), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 96 (Ont. C.A.) at page 102; R. v Wolkins, Supra; R. v. Davey, Supra, at paragraphs 51 and 87).

The SCC in R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16, in exploring criteria for appeals, held at paragraph 54 that palpable errors of fact and/or law in rulings shake public confidence.

R. v. Kahsai, 2023 SCC 20 at paragraphs 67-68 states that unfairness in either appearance or fact is sufficient to shake public confidence, whereas the threshold is determined by the opinions of reasonably informed and unbiased persons, and a community’s sense of fair play and decency.

Ultimately when a person is victimized by crime, and police stand idly by and refuse to address it, these thresholds are satisfied. The same is true when courts and regulators obstruct justice, and/or facilitate felony.

The public interest in diligent and reasonable police response is highlighted in R. v. Beaudry, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2007 SCC 5 at paragraph 35; Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129, 2007 SCC 41 at paragraphs 1, 36, 37, 44, & 140, inter alia. These tests underscore the fact that that public confidence is most certainly shaken in the absence of reasonable police response to crime, including events that might be actionable under the Canadian Criminal Code (495793 Ontario Ltd. (Central Auto Parts) v. Barclay, 2016 ONCA 656 at paragraph 51).

Unconstitutional Censorship, Sealing Orders, and Protection Orders

Mr. Dempsey’s Affidavits in British Columbia were sealed in their entirety, including public social media content and case descriptions containing no biographical information. Likewise, Mr. Dempsey’s Affidavit in S-228567, containing no body of statements and comprised solely of public data available via google search, was also permanently sealed against the tenets of settled Constitutional law (also see the Censorship page). Mr. Dempsey’s August 23rd, 2023 Affidavit, filed in out-of-province proceedings, was likewise sealed through extraordinary means by a panel of judges, and again against settled Constitutional law. The same panel who pronounced this held "settled Constitutional law cannot be re-litigated" in other matters. BCSC Charter matter S-229680 was sealed prior to the CAGE Respondents accepting service of its pleadings. The characteristics of the scandal have been concealed by means of unconstitutional sealing orders. The SCC has condemned unconstitutional censorship in accord with section 2 of the Charter, and has consistently reiterated a Citizen's Constitutional right to review court records in the interest of ensuring public accountability.

The threshold for an exception to the Constitutionally-enriched open court principle are exceptionally high. The SCC set forth the object of the open court principle in Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 75 at paragraph 53;

“The concept of open courts is deeply embedded in our common law tradition and has found constitutional protection in s. 2(b) of the Charter. This Court confirmed in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, the importance of this principle, which is inextricably linked to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). As stated by La Forest J. at para. 23: Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.”

In Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Kasirer J. predicated the threshold for exceptions to open court test on the preservation of individual dignity. At paragraph 34 in the same matter, the SCC defined the dignity threshold as information that;

“…strikes at what is sometimes said to be the biographical core identity of the individual concerned: information so sensitive that its dissemination could be an affront to dignity that the public would not tolerate, even in service of open proceedings.”

In cases where the foregoing threshold is achieved, applicants must nonetheless demonstrate that a sealing or redaction order does not jeopardize the substance of the case in the public eye, or stymie investigation efforts. Per Sherman Estate v. Donovan, Supra, at paragraph 3;

“Moreover, the protection of open courts does not stop there. The applicant must still show that the order is necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of that order restricting openness outweigh its negative effects.”

Concerning the disclosure of records that a Party may consider commercially-sensitive, the BCSC adopted a high threshold for an exception to the open court principle in United States v. Meng, 2021 BCSC 1253, in refusing a confidentiality order. At paragraphs 22 through 24, the court promulgated its analysis;

“As Ms. Meng noted, the Court in Sherman Estate at para. 41 recognized that commercial information may engage privacy interests that, in turn, may give rise to an important public interest. However, it is not at all clear that the documents now in issue do so. [...] On their face, these documents include reports and high level communications within HSBC relating to strategy and decisions about its business with Huawei between 2011 and 2014. Ms. Meng submits that a risk to HSBC’s privacy interests can be inferred from the documents themselves, as well as from the undisputed facts that: the documents are not publicly available; HSBC evidently considers them confidential; and the terms on which Ms. Meng received the documents require this application to be made. [...] The difficulty is that, as noted earlier, a privacy interest does not of itself meet the requirement of being an important public interest, and there is no basis on which to conclude that these documents engage that latter requirement. In Sierra Club at para. 55, Justice Iacobucci for the Court made clear that, to prevail over the public interest in openness, a commercial confidentiality interest must be more than merely specific to the applicant requesting the ban on publication. There must be a general principle at stake. No such general principle is shown to arise here.”

Per the foregoing citation, Iacobucci J. held in Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, 2002 SCC 41 at paragraph 55;

“A private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no “important commercial interest” for the purposes of this test.”

Further, at paragraph 33 in United States v. Meng, Supra;

“As I have noted, Ms. Meng is expected to argue, in her s. 32(1)(c) application, that the evidence in the HSBC documents is essential to her defense in the extradition proceedings, and that it may affect the ultimate decision on committal. Given the high public interest in the case as a whole, the potential centrality of the documents suggests that banning publication of their contents would have heavy negative effects on freedom of expression. There is a strong interest in the public being informed of the contents in order to understand the positions of the parties and the reasons for the Court’s decisions.”

Jurisprudence germane to the function of settlement privilege in sealing orders is established in Nguyen v. Dang, BCSC 1409. Paragraph 23 at subsection (c) outlines the legal test whereas settlement privilege cannot serve as justification for an exception to open court disclosure;

“Both the text referred to above and the various cases expressly discussing the issue, including Berry v. Cypost Corp., 2003 BCSC 1827 and Meyers v. Dunphy, 2007 NLCA 1 (CanLII), [2007] N.J. No. 5 (NLCA), list various types of communications which are exceptions to settlement privilege. In Cypost the list is as follows; (c) where the concluded settlement agreement is itself an issue.”

Germane to the retainer fee felony furnished in the October 17th, 2023 Affidavits of the CAGE lead counsel (also see the Felony Affidavit), the SCC held reiterated an exception to solicitor-client privilege in Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455 at paragraph 55;

“A second exception to solicitor‑client privilege was set out in Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, supra. Lamer J. for the Court, held that communications that are criminal in themselves (in this case, a fraudulent legal aid application) or that are intended to obtain legal advice to facilitate criminal activities are not privileged. At p. 893 this appears: There are certain exceptions to the principle of the confidentiality of solicitor‑client communications, however. Thus communications that are in themselves criminal or that are made with a view to obtaining legal advice to facilitate the commission of a crime will not be privileged, inter alia.”

Civil procedure rules in most jurisdictions remind us that a judge is unable to issue discretionary orders which would transgress open court thresholds. By way of example, Rule 85.04 of the NS Rules of Civil Procedure states;

“A judge may order that a court record be kept confidential only if the judge is satisfied that it is in accordance with law to do so, including the freedom of the press and other media under section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the open courts principle.”

A judge must thus order his/her conduct in accordance with Constitutional law when applications are made to preclude materials filed in court from public scrutiny. By means of these tests, we can conclude that to meet an exception to the open court principle;

The biographical information in the file must be personally sensitive to the extent that the general public would not tolerate its disclosure without good reason;
The commercial information in the file proposed for sealing must reside within an existing confidentiality agreement between the parties;
The sealed information must not be central to the disposition of the litigation, and/or the efficacy of an investigation, so as to preclude public scrutiny and/or intervention.

If filed court documents do not meet these thresholds, a judge cannot lawfully seal them.

Self-Represented Litigants, Bias, and Unfounded Vexatious Declarations

Mr. Dempsey was forced to self-represent in this scandal following the initial CAGE shareholder dispute, and was likewise denied ProBono support he was qualified for. Settled jurisprudence concerning self-represented litigants as established at the SCC in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470 at paragraph 4;

“We would add that we endorse the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.”

In Girao v. Cunningham, 2020 ONCA 260 (“Girao”), Lauwers J.A underscored the precedent set in Pintea concerning the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons. Paragraph 156 in Girao outlines an example where the same mandate had been ignored;

“The impression left by the limited trial record is that the trial judge allowed himself to be led by trial counsel’s arguments. Ms. Girao, a self-represented, legally unsophisticated plaintiff who struggled with the English language, was left to her own devices. Fairness required more, consistent with the expectations placed on the trial judge by Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons.”

The example in Girao has specific relevance to this matter whereas it highlights crucial evidence which was not properly addressed. At paragraph 174;

“I have outlined above the skewed orientation in the evidence that went to the jury. [...] Because some of the best evidence that supported the statutory accident benefits settlement was excluded by the trial rulings, there was little to oppose the defence’s evidence. Dr. Sanchez’s opinion also provided the trial judge with a lens through which he looked askance at the other medical evidence Ms. Girao led. Because of the basic unfairness that permeated the trial, I would set aside the ruling on the threshold motion.”

Lauwers J.A. underscored the requirement for diligence in fair proceedings at paragraphs 176 and 177 in Girao, which resulted in an order for a new trial;

“Ms. Girao was entitled to but did not get the active assistance of the trial judge whose responsibility it was to ensure the fairness of the proceeding. As a self-represented litigant, she was also entitled to, but did not get, basic fairness from trial defence counsel as officers of the court. The trial judge was also entitled to seek and to be provided with the assistance of counsel as officers of the court, in the ways discussed above. This did not happen. [...] I would allow the appellant’s appeal, set aside the judgment and orders, and order a new trial. I would award the costs of this appeal and of the trial to the appellant, including her disbursements.”

Similar to Mr. Dempsey’s evidence-based account in a September 6th, 2023 out-of-province Affidavit which detailed an unfounded and unjust vexatious declaration by BCSC chambers judge Andrew Majawa, the Alberta Court of Appeal addressed the unjust use of vexatious declarations against self-represented litigants as it pertains to procedure and case management. Slatter J. wrote in Jonsson v Lymer, 2020 ABCA (“Lymer”) 167 at paragraph 14;

“Vexatious litigants must be distinguished from self-represented litigants. Merely because a self-represented litigant uses a process that is not in accordance with the Rules of Court, or advances a claim without merit does not mean that they are vexatious. Many self-represented litigants are unfamiliar with court procedures, and are inadequately or inaccurately informed about their legal rights and the limitations on them. Merely because the self-represented litigant excessively or passionately believes in the merit of his or her cause does not make them vexatious.”

Lymer further highlights the importance of proper case management. I further note that by way of procedural violations in S-229680 which the lower courts were unwilling to address, Mr. Dempsey was denied the assignment of a case management judge; a provision under BCSC Practice Direction 5, which BCSC Scheduling had initially acknowledged in an email on January 27th, 2023, but later ignored at the request of AG Canada counsel. Slatter J. writes in paragraph 60 in Lymer;

“This was a case of complex litigation involving a difficult litigant which was already in case management. The issues should have been dealt with in case management. A blanket vexatious litigant order did not address the problem in a proportionate or effective way, and was not an effective or appropriate remedy for contempt. The case management judge should have granted a carefully crafted case management order, and possibly a litigation plan under R. 4.5, instead of a boilerplate vexatious litigant order.”

Lymer highlights the fact that at times, self represented litigants approach the judicial system in this fashion because they are unable to obtain counsel for one reason or another. Paragraph 71 details an example of a financial barrier. Mr. Dempsey, as detailed assiduously in his Affidavit records, had been consistently denied representation opportunities throughout proceedings following the initial CAGE shareholder dispute, and was beset by negligence in counsel in the latter initial dispute causing harm. Slatter J. writes at paragraph 71;

“The order also provides that the appellant cannot seek permission to commence fresh proceedings unless he is represented by a lawyer. Litigants have a right to represent themselves in court, and as previously noted, most self-represented litigants are unrepresented because they cannot afford a lawyer. Requiring the vexatious litigant to obtain a lawyer presents a financial barrier that may be insurmountable.”

At paragraphs 85 and 86 in Lymer, the court concludes that self-represented litigants should not be denied access to justice through onerous orders limiting their participation, in an absence of more reasonable and customary provisions;

“Parties are entitled to self-represent, and the court should be sensitive to the challenges faced by self-represented litigants. Vexatious litigant orders should only be made when other procedural techniques have proven to be inadequate and the offensive conduct is persistent. [...] In conclusion, the appeal is allowed. The vexatious litigant order should not have been granted in these circumstances, and in any event the form of order granted was overbroad. The sanction for contempt cannot stand given the failure to afford the appellant a fair hearing. The question of sanction for contempt is referred back to the trial court for a fresh hearing before a different judge.”

Double Standards Concerning the Object of Justice and Due-Diligence

A Lawyer v. The Law Society of British Columbia, 2021 BCSC 914 (“Lawyer”) is cited in comparison to the disposition of BCSC files S-220956 and S-229680; adjudicated by the same BCSC chambers judge, Andrew Majawa. Whereas S-229680 was dismissed via overt procedural violation near its inception, S-220956 was dismissed in contempt of an outstanding discovery order made April 1st, 2022 in the same court, and a plethora of procedural abuses and ignored legal tests, in the midst of ongoing criminal harassment and mischief (see zersetzung guide). Justice Majawa dismissed both files in a manner diametrically opposed to the precedents he set in Lawyer, and imposed unfounded encumbrances to ensure the CAGE CEO and related criminal actors could not be prosecuted in any BC court. This is relevant whereas it aligns with the fundamental argument in S-229680.

In Lawyer, justice Majawa ordered a sweeping investigation of an entire law practice on the basis of a hypothesis by the LSBC. Anneke Driessen, a LSBC staff lawyer, wrote on February 11th, 2022;

"The auditor identified, among other things, that you may have allowed clients to use your trust accounts for the flow of funds in the absence of substantial legal services related to those funds and/or in the absence of making reasonable inquiries," wrote Anneke Driessen, a law society staff lawyer on Feb. 11, 2020.”

The foregoing hypothesis is compared with hard evidence presented in Mr. Dempsey’s first Affidavit of S-220956, which BSCS Master Cameron acknowledged on April 1st, 2022 as compelling enough to serve on Canada Revenue Agency, and three private entities related to the initial CAGE shareholder dispute.

Justice Majawa offers his opinion concerning due diligence and the merit in investigations beginning at paragraph 63 in Lawyer;

“A key principle derived from these cases is that the investigatory powers of a regulator should not be interpreted too narrowly as doing so may “preclud[e] it from employing the best means by which to ‘uncover the truth’ and ‘protect the public’” (Wise v. LSUC, 2010 ONSC 1937 at para. 17 [Wise], citing Gore at para. 29). Thus, in my view, the powers granted to the Law Society by s. 36(b) of the LPA, and as operationalized by R. 4-55 of the Law Society Rules, should be read broadly to permit the investigation of a member’s entire practice, as that may in certain circumstances be the best means to “uncover the truth” and “protect the public” and to determine whether disciplinary action should be taken. Given the context within which lawyers and their trust accounts operate, the broad investigatory power authorizing the Law Society to conduct an “investigation of the books, records and accounts of the lawyer” provided for in s. 36(b) of the LPA and in R. 4-55 should not be distorted to mean something narrower without explicit statutory language suggesting the same: Wise at para. 17.”

Justice Majawa continues at paragraph 64 in underscoring the burden of duty by regulators;

“Moreover, the jurisprudence suggests that the investigatory powers of a regulator should be interpreted broadly in the context where a member of that self-regulating body has a duty to cooperate with such investigations: Gore at para. 20; Wise at para. 18. The petitioner in the present case was required to cooperate with the investigation. Section 36(d) of the LPA provides the Law Society with the authority to require its members to cooperate with an investigation authorized under s. 36(b) (i.e., a R. 4-55 investigation).”

At paragraph 60 in Lawyer, justice Majawa cites the basis of this duty and cooperation as serving the public trust in our institutions;

“Public trust in professionals, and their important role in society, is directly related to the extent regulators are able to supervise the conduct of those professionals. A professional regulator, in this case the Law Society, has an onerous obligation to ensure the protection of the public. The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the importance of the role of the professional regulator in Pharmascience Inc. v. Binet, 2006 SCC 48 [Pharmascience].”

At paragraph 54, justice Majawa writes that a broad (vs. narrow) investigation is germane to the object and purpose of the regulator executing the work;

“The broad scope of investigations conducted pursuant to s. 36(b) of the LPA and R. 4-55 of the Law Society Rules is consistent with the context, scheme, object, and purpose of the LPA and the Law Society Rules. The context within which these provisions are found is informed by the statutory objective and duty of the Law Society as set out in s. 3 of the LPA which provides that the duty of the Law Society is to “to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice”. Section 3 goes on to provide the means by which this duty is fulfilled including by “ensuring the independence, integrity, honour and competence of lawyers”, by “establishing standards and programs for the education, professional responsibility and competence of lawyers” and by “regulating the practice of law”.

At paragraph 74, justice Majawa introduces convenience and practicality as arguments in the interest of overarching diligence;

“If the petitioner’s view is correct and the scope of a R. 4-55 investigation must be related to the specific misconduct concerns giving rise to the chair’s reasonable belief, then it seems to me that the Law Society would be required to open a new R. 4-55 investigation each time a new area of concern was uncovered in order to conduct a broad investigation of a member’s practice. In my view, such a requirement would effectively negate the ability of the Law Society to broadly investigate a member’s practice when circumstances warrant it and would render investigations under R. 4-55 essentially the same as investigations under R.3-5. An interpretation that renders a provision duplicative of another is an absurdity that should be avoided: Jorgensen v. Surface Rights Board, 2021 BCSC 396 at para. 98.”

Finally, justice Majawa states at paragraph 121 in Lawyer;

“A permanent stay of a proceeding as a remedy for an abuse of process is only appropriate in the “clearest of cases”: R v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16 at para. 31. Such cases are generally those where state conduct compromises trial fairness or where state conduct does not threaten trial fairness but risks undermining the integrity of the judicial process.”

Further to the same comments, paragraph 30 in Babos states;

“A stay of proceedings is the most drastic remedy a criminal court can order (R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, at para. 53). It permanently halts the prosecution of an accused. In doing so, the truth-seeking function of the trial is frustrated and the public is deprived of the opportunity to see justice done on the merits. In many cases, alleged victims of crime are deprived of their day in court.”

State interference in this scandal, meeting the test criteria cited above in Bedford and Khadr, is suffused in these matters. In dismissing both BCSC files and ordering egregious special costs, justice Majawa acted in a manner diametrically opposed to his own ruling in Lawyer, in enabling the CAGE respondents to escape prosecution, enabling criminal actors related to the same respondents to escape prosecution, enabling AG Canada's request to skirt procedural rules go unanswered, and enabling the powers of the BC Bench to be weaponized against a law-abiding Citizen seeking relief. It must be underscored that criminal mischief related to the Respondents was the principal factor that occasioned the opening of S-220956 in the absence of RCMP support. None of this was addressed (see Litigation page and Testimony). Furthermore, none of the principles justice Majawa outlined in Lawyer were applied in any capacity, in any of the five courts involved in this scandal, by any other judge or adjudicator involved.

Unfounded Contempt Rulings used to Obstruct Justice and Impose Reverse Onus.

[Oppressed through Criminal Mischief; Denied Customary Safe Avenues; and Punished When Seeking Relief]

Cromwell, J. outlined the just standard for civil contempt rulings at paragraph 36 in Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79;

“The Court confirmed that the contempt power is a discretionary one. If courts were to find contempt too easily, a court’s outrage might be treated as just so much bluster that might ultimately cheapen the role and authority of the very judicial power it seeks to protect. The Court also stated that the court’s contempt power should be used “cautiously and with great restraint”. It is an enforcement power of last, rather than first resort.”

Mr. Dempsey was compelled to email a redacted Affidavit to relevant government and law enforcement agencies in late 2022 as a result of related criminal mischief, and in the absence of the customary he was entitled to under Constitutional law. The Affidavit contained no biographical or commercial data and was unlawfully sealed. The court ignored contextual evidence and the entirety of matters which would have otherwise occasioned an investigation of the CAGE entity and related actors, which is likewise contary to the precedent set in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 at paragraph 29;

“The notion of moral voluntariness was first introduced in Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, for the purpose of explaining the defense of necessity and classifying it as an excuse. It was borrowed from the American legal theorist George Fletcher’s discussion of excuses in Rethinking Criminal Law (1978). A person acts in a morally involuntary fashion when, faced with perilous circumstances, she is deprived of a realistic choice whether to break the law. By way of illustration in Perka, Dickson J. evoked the situation of a lost alpinist who, on the point of freezing to death, breaks into a remote mountain cabin. The alpinist confronts a painful dilemma: freeze to death or commit a criminal offense. Yet as Dickson J. pointed out at p. 249, the alpinist’s choice to break the law “is no true choice at all; it is remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts”, here of self-preservation. The Court in Perka thus conceptualized the defense of necessity as an excuse. An excuse, Dickson J. maintained, concedes that the act was wrongful, but withholds criminal attribution to the actor because of the dire circumstances surrounding its commission. He summarized the rationale of necessity in this way, at p. 250:

“At the heart of this defense is the perceived injustice of punishing violations of the law in circumstances in which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice available; the act was wrong but it is excused because it was realistically unavoidable.”

At paragraph 30, LeBel J. underscores a requirement for due diligence in contempt hearings, whereas civil contempt contains a quasi-criminal component;

“Like necessity, duress operates to relieve a person of criminal liability only after he has been found to have committed the prohibited act with the relevant mens rea: see also Bergstrom v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 539, at p. 544 (per McIntyre J.).”

The matter of ongoing online and CIMIC-style mischief, beginning November 2021, was at no time investigated and prosecuted by police. This harassment included on-heels stalking, break-and-enters, death threats, amid other forms of harassment as outlined in Mr. Dempsey’s affidavits. Mr. Dempsey made concerted efforts to seek customary safe avenue to police, which was not provided. The SCC held at paragraph 66 in Ruzic;

“Notably, at common law, there is no requirement that the threats be made by a person who is present at the scene of the crime. It has been said that the threat must be “immediate” or “imminent” and that persons threatened must resort to the protection of the law if they can do so. While the defense is not available to those who have “an obvious safe avenue of escape”, I agree with Martin J.A. that the operative test is “whether the accused failed to avail himself or herself of some opportunity to escape or render the threat ineffective.”

Likewise at paragraph 35 in Ruzic;

“Without requiring a full mens rea, the Court decided that, generally speaking, absent very clear and explicit language to the contrary, at least a defense of due diligence should be available to the accused.”

In further consideration of deliberate and wilful intent as it relates to contempt, this court in R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 (“Hibbert”) has provided a defense germane to the matter at stake. Per paragraph 52 in Hibbert,

“As a justification the defense of necessity can be related to Blackstone's concept of a "choice of evils". It would exculpate actors whose conduct could reasonably have been viewed as "necessary" in order to prevent a greater evil than that resulting from the violation of the law. As articulated, especially in some of the American cases, it involves a utilitarian balancing of the benefits of obeying the law as opposed to disobeying it, and when the balance is clearly in favor of disobeying, exculpates an actor who contravenes a criminal statute. This is the "greater good" formulation of the necessity defense: in some circumstances, it is alleged, the values of society, indeed of the criminal law itself, are better promoted by disobeying a given statute than by observing it.”

Hibbert likewise encapsulates the core negligence of the BCCA hearings, whereas this court has underscored the necessity of adducing all relevant evidence pertaining to contextual background. Lamer C.J. writes at paragraph 59;

“This Court has previously indicated that when assessing the reasonableness of an accused's conduct for the purposes of determining whether he or she should be excused from criminal responsibility, it is appropriate to employ an objective standard that takes into account the particular circumstances of the accused, including his or her ability to perceive the existence of alternative courses of action.”

In Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79, paragraph 62, this court identified two qualifications to the general rule that a contempt finding at the first hearing is final:

“First, rule 60.11 contemplates that a judge may set aside a finding of contempt if the contemnor purges the contempt, since the contempt proceedings have secured compliance with the court order. Second, contempt proceedings are subject to the standard principles that allow parties to reopen findings in exceptional circumstances to permit consideration of fresh evidence or new facts that were not before the court at the first hearing.”

The issue is that the contextual background necessitating disclosure of a redacted Affidavit (which nonetheless met the requirements of the Open Court Test in Sherman), was not considered by any court, and was likewise obstructed by law enforcement. In requiring Mr. Dempsey to purge contempt before allowing an Appeal of S-229680 (which in its own right was dismissed via procedural violations), the BC Appellate Court ignored the underlying principle this court established in Carey at paragraph 37, and Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799 at paragraph 9;

“A judge may properly exercise his or her discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice in the circumstances of the case.”

Treatment of the contextual evidentiary record can purge the unlawful contempt orders made in the BCCA. Instead, these orders were used to prevent a trial of the common issues, which, ironically, concern the same necessitating factors that had invited the Respondents’ contempt Applications to begin with.

Mr. Dempsey has demonstrated a consistent history of compliance with existing sealing orders, including calling for the same when appropriate, as was the case following an act of negligence by his retained legal counsel in the initial CAGE shareholder dispute, whereas counsel had neglected to seal confidential materials at inception. This is evident in;

The initial consensual sealing order in the initial CAGE dispute;
The sealing order requested by Mr. Dempsey at the inception of S-220956 alongside its originating pleadings on February 8th, 2022; and;
From inception through to September 2022 in S-220956, when the Mr. Dempsey’s redacted Affidavit was forwarded to a basket of potential interveners in the midst of exceptionally difficult circumstances and in the absence of safe avenue (R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 @ paragraphs 29, 66).

Finally, the contextual bearing in R. v. Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 509 at paragraphs 24 and 25 is exceptionally relevant ;

"The integrity of the justice system was further tarnished, in the judge’s view, by the reticence and [translation] “sclerotic solidarity” that characterized the testimony at trial of Mr. Asselin’s fellow prison guards (para. 79). [...] Having found that Mr. Bellusci had been provoked and subjected by a state actor to intolerable physical and psychological abuse, it was open to the trial judge to decline to enter a conviction against him. As the Court explained in Tobiass, “if a past abuse were serious enough, then public confidence in the administration of justice could be so undermined that the mere act of carrying forward in the light of it would constitute a new and ongoing abuse sufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings” (para. 96)."

Standards of Review vs. Unjust Concurrence

[Replication of Palpable Errors of Fact & Law in Appellate Venues and the SCC]

Germane to section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Mr. Dempsey was denied the right of protection against misconstrued law; evident in the proceedings themselves and in draft orders presented by CAGE counsel which were contemptuous of prior rulings, including judicial commentary during the same hearings. The SCC held in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (CanLII), [2019] 4 SCR 653 (“Vavilov”) at paragraph 19;

“On this point, we recall the observation of Gibbs J. in Queensland v. Commonwealth (1977), 139 C.L.R. 585 (H.C.A.), which this Court endorsed in Craig, at para. 26: No Justice is entitled to ignore the decisions and reasoning of his predecessors, and to arrive at his own judgment as though the pages of the law reports were blank, or as though the authority of a decision did not survive beyond the rising of the Court. A Justice, unlike a legislator, cannot introduce a programme of reform which sets at nought decisions formerly made and principles formerly established. It is only after the most careful and respectful consideration of the earlier decision, and after giving due weight to all the circumstances, that a Justice may give effect to his own opinions in preference to an earlier decision of the Court.”

The reverse precedent in Vavilov applies in this case insofar as past orders should be scrutinized when they are pronounced against compelling evidence and the principles of Constitutional law. Per paragraph 20 in Vavilov;

“This Court has in the past revisited precedents that were determined to be unsound in principle, that had proven to be unworkable and unnecessarily complex to apply, or that had attracted significant and valid judicial, academic and other criticism: Craig, at paras. 28-30; Henry, at paras. 45-47; Fraser, at para. 135 (per Rothstein J., concurring in the result); Bernard, at pp. 858-59. Although adhering to the established jurisprudence will generally promote certainty and predictability, in some instances doing so will create or perpetuate uncertainty in the law: Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v. Ranville, 1982 CanLII 202 (SCC), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 518, at p. 528; Bernard, at p. 858; R. v. B. (K.G.), 1993 CanLII 116 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, at p. 778. In such circumstances, “following the prior decision because of stare decisis would be contrary to the underlying value behind that doctrine, namely, clarity and certainty in the law”: Bernard, at p. 858. These considerations apply here.”

Vavilov at paragraph 102 details criteria concerning the customary standard of reasonableness;

“To be reasonable, a decision must be based on reasoning that is both rational and logical. It follows that a failure in this respect may lead a reviewing court to conclude that a decision must be set aside. Reasonableness review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for error”: Irving Pulp & Paper, at para. 54, citing Newfoundland Nurses, at para. 14. However, the reviewing court must be able to trace the decision maker’s reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in its overarching logic, and it must be satisfied that “there is [a] line of analysis within the given reasons that could reasonably lead the tribunal from the evidence before it to the conclusion at which it arrived”: Ryan, at para. 55; Southam, at para. 56. Reasons that “simply repeat statutory language, summarize arguments made, and then state a peremptory conclusion” will rarely assist a reviewing court in understanding the rationale underlying a decision and “are no substitute for statements of fact, analysis, inference and judgment”: R. A. Macdonald and D. Lametti, “Reasons for Decision in Administrative Law” (1990), 3 C.J.A.L.P. 123, at p. 139; see also Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 750, 27 Imm. L.R. (4th) 151, at paras. 57-59.”

As continued at paragraph 104 in Vavilov;

“Similarly, the internal rationality of a decision may be called into question if the reasons exhibit clear logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise. This is not an invitation to hold administrative decision makers to the formalistic constraints and standards of academic logicians. However, a reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that the decision maker’s reasoning “adds up”.

The court in Vavilov likewise declared that great care must be taken in matters where judicial decisions have significant impact on the parties, such as the exorbitant cost certification involved in the retainer fee scandal, amid procedural miscarriage and criminal interference. Per Vavilov at paragraphs 133-134;

“It is well established that individuals are entitled to greater procedural protection when the decision in question involves the potential for significant personal impact or harm: Baker, at para. 25. However, this principle also has implications for how a court conducts reasonableness review. Central to the necessity of adequate justification is the perspective of the individual or party over whom authority is being exercised. Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes. The principle of responsive justification means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention. This includes decisions with consequences that threaten an individual’s life, liberty, dignity or livelihood.” [...] Moreover, concerns regarding arbitrariness will generally be more acute in cases where the consequences of the decision for the affected party are particularly severe or harsh, and a failure to grapple with such consequences may well be unreasonable. For example, this Court has held that the Immigration Appeal Division should, when exercising its equitable jurisdiction to stay a removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, consider the potential foreign hardship a deported person would face: Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84.”

Orders that transgress the reasonableness threshold are customarily overturned. Per Nova Scotia Government and General Employees Union v. Nova Scotia Health Authority, 2024 NSCA 42 at paragraph 24), .

“As a result of the finding of unreasonableness, the reviewing judge quashed the Award and remitted the matter for a new hearing before a different arbitrator.”

Concerning the standard of correctness, the SCC held in Vavilov at paragraph 127;

“The principles of justification and transparency require that an administrative decision maker’s reasons meaningfully account for the central issues and concerns raised by the parties. The principle that the individual or individuals affected by a decision should have the opportunity to present their case fully and fairly underlies the duty of procedural fairness and is rooted in the right to be heard: Baker, at para. 28. The concept of responsive reasons is inherently bound up with this principle, because reasons are the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate that they have actually listened to the parties.”

Farrar J.A. wrote in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Lawen Estate, 2021 NSCA 39, at paragraph 13;

“The first two issues in this appeal involve the application of constitutional legal principles. The standard of review is correctness.”

Likewise at paragraph 44 in the same matter;

“In MacKay v. Manitoba, 1989 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1989] 2 S8.C.R. 357, the Court found the determination of Charter issues requires a factual basis. The absence of a factual underpinning is fatal to a challenge to the constitutional validity of legislation. Courts cannot consider Charter issues in a factual void, nor can they be based on the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel.”

The Supreme Court of Canada in Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502 held at paragraphs 79 and 80;

“Third, the ability to challenge a decision on the basis that it is unreasonable does not necessarily change the standard of review that applies to other flaws in the decision or in the decision-making process. For instance, the standard for determining whether the decision maker complied with the duty of procedural fairness will continue to be “correctness”. [...] It will not be necessary to determine whether the decision made by the Warden in the instant case was unlawful on the basis of unreasonableness. As I will explain below, the decision was unlawful because it was procedurally unfair.”

Supreme Court of Canada Docket Entry & Registry Rules

A hearing concerning the issues of the scandal was precluded at the Supreme Court of Canada ("SCC") without explanation nor analogue. This preclusion transgresses a wide variety of applicable legal tests, though it is sufficient to rely on the jurisprudence in this page and the following criterion;

The SCC, in R. v. C.P., 2021 SCC 19, has affirmed its basis for inviting appeals evidencing miscarriage in justice. Former Deputy Attorney General and Minister of Justice lacobucci J. wrote at paragraph 137;

“There is no basis to believe that a serious argument pointing to a miscarriage of justice would not meet the public interest standard for leave to appeal to the Court [...] The Supreme Court would and does exercise its leave requirement in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

The SCC has affirmed its basis for inviting appeals evidencing unfounded censorship, whereas, the same constitutionally-enriched right to an open court has been violated throughout the lower court files by extraordinary means, including materials expected to be available to the public online. This has severely skewed public perception of the matter, has precluded intervention opportunities, and has encumbered investigation. In Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, Kasirer J. writes at paragraph 1;

“This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.”

Section 14 of the SCC FAQ page (https://www.scc-csc.ca/contact/faq/qa-qr-eng.aspx#f14) outlines the docket entry threshold as follows;

“In most cases, appeals are heard by the Court only if leave to appeal is given. Such leave, or permission, will be given by the Court when a case involves a question of public importance. There are cases, however, where leave is not required. In criminal cases, there is an automatic right of appeal where an acquittal has been set aside in the provincial court of appeal or where one judge in the provincial court of appeal dissents on a question of law. In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has a special kind of "Reference" jurisdiction, original in character, given by s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act. The Governor in Council (Federal Government) may refer to the Court, for its opinion, constitutional or other questions.”

This matter, as outlined, likewise concerns criminal violations related to, informing the onset of, and subsequently impacting the civil proceedings.

Finally, the SCC has likewise granted leave to appeal following a Motion for Reconsideration where the file concerned genuine and serious questions of law of sufficient public importance. Lamer C.J. wrote at paragraph 36 in R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597;

“In addition to finding that this Court has jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in this instance, I believe that the applicant's application raises a genuine and serious question of law of sufficient public importance to warrant review by this Court. Therefore, I would grant the applicant’s motion for reconsideration of our previous order refusing leave to appeal, and grant leave. [...] Out of respect for the integrity of the leave to appeal process, and consistent with our established practice of refusing to elaborate our justifications for granting or denying leave to appeal, I would postpone any potential discussion of the substantive issues raised by this case until this Court has become formally seized with the merits of this appeal.”

My motions to stay costs, to expedite the stay, and Writ of Certiorari remained derelict at the SCC Registry for six months, without being referred to the court as is required under SCC Rules 51(1) and 54(4). Take note, these are Rules and not guidelines. Concurrently, the CAGE had aggressively pursued collection efforts for the cost scandal in out-of-province hearings.

SCC 51(1): The motion shall be submitted to a judge or the Registrar;
(a) after the reply is filed or at the end of the five-day period referred to in Rule 50, as the case may be; or
(b) if no response to the motion is filed, at the end of the 10-day period referred to in Rule 49.

SCC 54(4): After the response to the motion is filed or at the end of the 10-day period referred to in subrule (1), the Registrar shall send a notice of hearing of the motion in Form 69, with any modifications that the circumstances require, to all parties.

As is detailed at the Litigation page with exhibits, SCC registry staff, being federal employees, had violated these rules and allowed the motions to remain derelict, long after the CAGE and the Attorney General of Canada had filed response materials within the customary timetable.

Security of Costs

In the simplest terms, security of costs orders require litigants to pay some or all of a respondent’s legal fees up-front as a condition for pursuing an appeal. While appropriate in some circumstances to prevent meritless appeals, it can be also used as an unfounded deterrent to justice. As such, a legal test concerning special circumstances is employed.

Williams Lake Conservation Co. v. Kimberly-Lloyd Developments Ltd., 2005 NSCA 44 promulgates the test at paragraph 11;

“Generally, a risk, without more, that the appellant may be unable to afford a costs award is insufficient to establish “special circumstances”. It is usually necessary that there be evidence that, in the past, “the appellant has acted in an insolvent manner toward the respondent” which gives the respondent an objective basis to be concerned about his recovery of prospective appeal costs. The example which most often has appeared and supported an order for security is a past and continuing failure by the appellant to pay a costs award or to satisfy a money judgment: Frost v. Herman, at ¶ 9-10; MacDonnell v. Campbell, 2001 NSCA 123, at ¶ 4-5; Leddicote, at ¶ 15-16; White at ¶ 4-7; Monette v. Jordan (1997), 1997 NSCA 163 (CanLII), 163 N.S.R. (2d) 75, at ¶ 7; Smith v. Heron, at ¶ 15-17; Jessome v. Walsh at ¶ 16-19.”

Similarly at paragraph 15 in the same case law;

“Kimberly-Lloyd has not shown that WLCC has acted in an insolvent manner towards Kimberly-Lloyd, or toward anyone else, and has not established any other “special circumstance” required for an order for security on appeal. Even if the appeal fails and if costs are awarded, there is no evidence that the amount of costs would be substantially higher than the amount which, in the past, has been ordered against WLCC, and which WLCC has paid.”

Appeal hearings, when they were permitted to occur, had replicated the same errors that characterized the lower court hearings, and had always required security of cost payments up-front, irrespective of a lack of discernible special circumstances. The tool was likewise weaponized as a vehicle of obstruction. In a 2024 out-of-province appeal concerning the enforcement of the retainer fee scandal (see the Litigation page and Felony Affidavit), the appellate judge arbitrarily tripled (3x) the amount of security I would need to pay compared to the security amount I paid in a near-identical Appeal in 2023, concerning similar subject matter and a comparable workload. No explanation was provided. The security amount paid in the 2023 Appeal was already five (5) times higher than the costs the motion judge had ordered in the lower court. While this is nowhere near the BC cost scandal in terms of magnitude, the Appeal concerned the same scandal, and the file was suffused with layers of evidence concerning fraud, perjury, collusion, and criminal interference.

The Legal Defense of Necessity

In matters where a concurrence of adjudicators in all three levels of court dispose a matter in palpable error of law and/or fact (miscarriage of justice), and where the effects of that concurrence occasion serious impact and leave a Citizen with no further means of customary recourse, are the Citizen’s rights under the Constitution nullified?

Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 clearly holds that the judicial framework acts in the service of and is subject to the Constitution. The same occasions a legal defense in refusing to obey unconstitutional judicial orders and mandates, as is detailed in R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 2001 SCC 24 at paragraph 29; and R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973 at paragraphs 52 & 59. Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79 at paragraph 37 mitigates contempt findings that are mated to injustice.

The foregoing legal tests were developed from the precedents set in Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, which had articulated the legal defenses of justification and excuse on the basis of necessity. Perka applies to the present circumstances with respect to peaceful civil disobedience, though the emphasis is vectored toward a defense of justification and necessity. Per Wilson J. in Perka at page 268;

“As Dickson J. points out, criminal law theory recognizes a distinction between justification and excuse. In the case of justification the wrongfulness of the alleged offensive act is challenged; in the case of excuse the wrongfulness is acknowledged but a ground for the exercise of judicial compassion for the actor is asserted.”

Dickson J. wrote in Perka at pages 245-246;

“In Morgentaler, supra, I characterized necessity as an “ill-defined and elusive concept”. Despite the apparently growing consensus as to the existence of a defense of necessity that statement is equally true today. This is no doubt in part because, though apparently laying down a single rule as to criminal liability, the “defense” of necessity in fact is capable of embracing two different and distinct notions. As Mr. Justice Macdonald observed succinctly but accurately in the Salvador case, supra, at p. 542: Generally speaking, the defense of necessity covers all cases where non-compliance with law is excused by an emergency or justified by the pursuit of some greater good. [...] The first is a utilitarian principle to the effect that, within certain limits, it is justifiable in an emergency to break the letter of the law if breaking the law will avoid a greater harm than obeying it. The second is a humanitarian principle to the effect that, again within limits, it is excusable in an emergency to break the law if compliance would impose an intolerable burden on the accused.”

Wilson J. characterizes the foregoing in general terms at page 274 in the same matter;

“Returning to the defense of necessity as a justification, it may generally be said that an act is justified on grounds of necessity if the court can say that not only was the act a necessary one but it was rightful rather than wrongful. When grounded on the fundamental principle that a successful defense must characterize an act as one which the accused was within his rights to commit, it becomes immediately apparent that the defense does not depend on the immediacy or “normative involuntariness” of the accused’s act.”

Wilson, J. articulates the characteristics of the legal defense in Perka at page 279;

“Where the defense of necessity is invoked as a justification the issue is simply whether the accused was right in pursuing the course of behavior giving rise to the charge. Thus, where the act otherwise constitutes a criminal offense (i.e. it embodies both mens rea and the actus reus) the accused must show that he operated under a conflicting legal duty which made his seemingly wrongful act right. But such justification must be premised on a right or duty recognized by law. This excludes conduct attempted to be justified on the ground of an ethical duty internal to the conscience of the accused as well as conduct sought to be justified on the basis of a perceived maximization of social utility resulting from it. Rather, the conduct must stem from the accused’s duty to satisfy his legal obligations and to respect the principle of the universality of rights.”

In keeping with Wilson J.’s comments in Perka, the conflicting legal duty concerns the Constitution as it pertains to this scandal. Namely section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being the same section of the Charter as it pertains to the cost felony and disposition of proceedings, and section 24(1) as it pertains to the characteristics of the scandal generally speaking, in the mode of criminal harassment and privacy crimes. It is likewise a matter of conscience in my case (section 2242 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Section 2(a), Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, Supra). On the heels of unaddressed criminal mischief and miscarriage of justice in the BC proceedings, this scandal involves felony facilitated through legitimate authorities in BC, which was likewise enforced out-of-Province, and precluded from review at the SCC. A defense of justification applies on the basis of the evidence, applicable legal tests, and the constitutional guardrail concerning these events as is outlined in the milestones. Per page 259 in Perka;

“Where the accused places before the Court sufficient evidence to raise the issue, the onus is on the Crown to meet it beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The defense is accentuated insofar as customary avenues of recourse have been removed, and a trial of the common issues had been prevented from occurring. Obviously, compliance with victimhood under these conditions is impermissible.

The Constitutional Guardrail: Affecting an End to Abusive Proceedings

The SCC established criteria for a stay of proceedings in R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, in circumstances where courts overstep their competency, the same case law that BCSC justice Andrew Majawa referred to in A Lawyer v. The Law Society of British Columbia, Supra, at paragraph 121. Per Moldaver J. at paragraphs 76 through 78 in Babos;

[76] “A stay may be justified for an abuse of process under the residual category when the state’s conduct “contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process” (R. v. O’Connor, 1995 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 73). A stay may be justified, in exceptional circumstances, when the conduct “is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward [with the trial] in the light of it [would] be offensive” (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, 1997 CanLII 322 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, at para. 91)."

[77] “There are two public interests at play: “the affront to fair play and decency” and “the effective prosecution of criminal cases”. Where the affront is “disproportionate”, the administration of justice is “best served by staying the proceedings” (R. v. Conway, 1989 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at p. 1667).”

[78] “In other words, when the conduct is so profoundly and demonstrably inconsistent with the public perception of what a fair justice system requires, proceeding with a trial means condoning unforgivable conduct.”

The foregoing precedent in Babos accurately reflects the characteristics of the proceedings and related engagements. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391 reflects the same precedent and further considers a question concerning systemic prevalence and longevity. In other words, can a Party beset by obstruction of justice and misconduct reasonably expect their situation to change? Per paragraphs 91 and 110 in Tobiass;

[91] “The first criterion is critically important. It reflects the fact that a stay of proceedings is a prospective remedy. A stay of proceedings does not redress a wrong that has already been done. It aims to prevent the perpetuation of a wrong that, if left alone, will continue to trouble the parties and the community as a whole in the future. See O’Connor, at para. 82. For this reason, the first criterion must be satisfied even in cases involving conduct that falls into the residual category. See O’Connor, at para. 75. The mere fact that the state has treated an individual shabbily in the past is not enough to warrant a stay of proceedings. For a stay of proceedings to be appropriate in a case falling into the residual category, it must appear that the state misconduct is likely to continue in the future or that the carrying forward of the prosecution will offend society’s sense of justice. Ordinarily, the latter condition will not be met unless the former is as well ‑‑ society will not take umbrage at the carrying forward of a prosecution unless it is likely that some form of misconduct will continue. There may be exceptional cases in which the past misconduct is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in the light of it will be offensive.”

[110] "An ongoing affront to judicial independence may be such that any further proceedings in the case would lack the appearance that justice would be done. In such a case the societal interest would not be served by a decision on the merits that is tainted by an appearance of injustice. The interest in preserving judicial independence will trump any interest in continuing the proceedings. Even in the absence of an ongoing appearance of injustice, the very severity of the interference with judicial independence could weigh so heavily against any societal interest in continuing the proceedings that the balancing process would not be engaged."

In keeping with the foregoing, and whereas it is well established that a three-year pattern of obstruction, abuse, and weaponization of legitimate authority has remained constant despite ongoing attempts to seek correction and recourse through customary channels, the onus falls on Mr. Dempsey to act in unilateral capacities in defense of his rights under the Constitution. The alternative is to accept victimhood (R. v. Ruzic, Supra). Furhter, in this case, it would condone a grand-theft felony through the special costs scandal. In view of ongoing and palpable obstruction by both jurists and staff members, reasonable persons would agree that the onus falls on courts to accept ownership of any contempt allegation when they are implicated in an abuse of process (Hill v. Hamilton‑Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, Supra, at paragraph 37). Negligence on the part of Mr. Dempsey in defense of his Constitutional rights would likewise suggest that the same rights were subject to privilege. Mr. Dempsey is but one Citizen among millions in Canada that relies on the public service, which underscores its public importance.

The Weaponization Costs; Felonies Facilitated Through Legitimate Authorities

Felony Affidavit [Click]

Mr. Dempsey has reiterated a number of times that a trial of the common issues has never taken place, that criminal violations and procedural violations impacting the file have derailed proceedings, and, in view of hard evidence implicating the CAGE CEO in fraud, collusion, and perjury as presented in S-220956, the BCSC validated the merit in the same file on April 1st 2022, thereby displacing any consideration of special costs being applied to a meritless proceeding. A summary overview of special costs is found in the matter of Nuttall v. Krekovic, 2018 BCCA 341, where the court explained these principles at paragraphs 26 and 29;

“First, special costs have a punitive or deterrent element and are only appropriate where the conduct in issue is deserving of punishment or rebuke. This well-known principle stems from numerous cases, most recently enunciated in J.P. v. British Columbia (Children and Family Development), 2018 BCCA 325 at para. 28. The chambers judge erred in principle by failing to consider the cautious approach to an award of special costs against a lawyer personally, as well as the kind of reprehensible conduct that would justify such an award, mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 and more recently in Quebec (Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions) v. Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26. [...] Consistent with these decisions, this Court has long held that such orders should be made only in “very special circumstances”, and not on the basis of mistake, error in judgment or even negligence: see Hannigan v. Ikon Office Solutions Inc. (1998), 1998 CanLII 6141 (BC CA), 61 B.C.L.R. (3d) 270 (C.A.); Pierce v. Baynham, 2015 BCCA 188 at para. 41.”

To ensure this tool is not able to be unlawfully or prejudicially weaponized in a court of law, the customary purpose and nature of Special Costs was reiterated in a variety of precedents. The nature and purpose of special costs was described in 567 Hornby Apartment Ltd. v. Le Soleil Restaurant Inc., 220 BCCA 69 at paragraph 42;

“Special costs are not compensatory; they are punitive: Grewal v. Sandhu, 2012 BCCA 26 at para. 106; Smithies Holdings Inc. v. RCV Holdings Ltd., 2017 BCCA 177 at para. 56.

Tanious v. The Empire Life Insurance Company, 2019 BCCA 329 held at paragraphs 49, 53;

"Although there may be a close relationship between actual legal expenses and special costs, they are not necessarily the same. [...] The purpose of special costs is to censure and deter litigation misconduct, not to compensate the plaintiff"

Bradshaw Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 54 B.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (S.C.), held at paragraph 44;

"Special costs are fees a reasonable client would pay a reasonably competent solicitor to do the work described in the bill."

Gichuru v. Smith, 2014 BCCA 414 held at paragraph 155;

"When assessing special costs, summarily or otherwise, a judge must only allow those fees that are objectively reasonable in the circumstances. This is because the purpose of a special costs award is to provide an indemnity to the successful party, not a windfall. While a judge need not follow the exact same procedure as a registrar, the ultimate award of special costs must be consistent with what the registrar would award in similar circumstances. Thus, a judge must conduct an inquiry into whether the fees claimed by the successful litigant were proper and reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding as set out in R. 14-1(3)(a), taking into account all of the relevant circumstances of the case and with particular attention to the non-exhaustive list of factors in R. 14-1(3)(b).

Aside from the enormity of issues germane to this scandal, the weaponization of costs can be considered a scandal in its own right. Again irrespective of the fact that none of the common issues were tried and the merit in the matter was obstructed, the cost metric applied invites outrage on the basis of simple observations.

The enormity of the cost amount certified in November 2023, almost $400,000 CAD, was shown to be due to overlapping counsel applied to the same tasks, four in total, on a grossly accentuated tariff. This example is shown on the landing page of this website alongside the criminal harassment actors that cheered it on. The same trend occurred during a similarly compromised BCCA hearing earlier that year, whereas a simple Application was certified at $41,217.53 in favor of the CAGE Respondents, whereas three counsel had overlapped various tasks. The latter hearing was comparable to the motion before an out-of-province judge, which was certified at $500. The result is a BCCA cost metric 83 times higher in a similar Application.

Using S-220956 as a specific example, and again notwithstanding miscarriage of justice as regards to its substance, the Affidavit of CAGE lead counsel indicates seven lawyers and two paralegals assigned to overlapping tasks. Using the out-of-province cost metric as a guide, considering the eight (8) chambers appearances in this file, and assuming a reasonable allocation of one lawyer, regular costs might ordinarily be tabulated at $4,500. Costs were instead certified at $295.581.11, and lead counsel's Affidavit was accepted at face value as fact. Per the November 2023 transcript, CAGE counsel claimed that the client was charged every penny. S-229680, dismissed just weeks after it was filed amid nine (9) procedural violations, was billed at $78,385.36. Four lawyers were assigned to that file with only one hearing held, eliciting a 156x cost multiplier.

Question: why would the CAGE CEO agree to be charged retainer fees in a manner 83 times higher than what is otherwise considered customary? To be specific, the Retainer fees cited in the Affidavit of his lead counsel maintains a 65x multiplier in S-220956, and a 156x multiplier in S-229680. The answer is he would not, nor would any reasonable litigant. Because CAGE counsel stated their Client paid the full amount shown in their expense Affidavit, and that it was reasonable and necessary to conduct the proceedings, investigators have compelling grounds to suspect perjury. The 2021 Settlement Affidavit sworn by the CAGE CEO contains two accounts of perjury in its own right, and whereas both of these acts are obvious within the Affidavit itself.

Reasonable and fair-minded persons can likewise infer that;

Canada’s biggest litigation firm is expected to provide better (more efficient) case management options, and;
Clients are smart enough to jump ship before agreeing to allocate grossly unreasonable retainer fees (every coupon clipper knows this!).

Finally, and for these reasons in addition, it is unreasonable to assume that the CAGE CEO was charged $417,419.50, and that the same amount resides in Osler, Hoskin, & Harcourt LLP trust accounts. By way of irony, the same BCSC chambers judge, Andrew Majawa, who adjudicated the two main actions in this scandal in violation of procedural rules and the jurisprudence cited in this page, also wrote the precedent for investigating the entirety of a lawyer's trust account in Lawyer, Supra, at paragraph 63. The same principle applies here. The special costs retainer fee scandal, visible by means of counsel's sworn Affidavits, is a grand-theft felony facilitated through legitimate authorities. There is no other way to describe it, and it must be prosecuted.

The Legal Provision for the Testimony of Canada Revenue Agency Officials and its Import

Testimony of CRA officials can help the court adjudicate a variety of the issues germane to this scandal, including the criminal involvement of third-party actors related to the Respondents.

In April 1st, 2022, the BCSC ordered service on Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) as a result of hard evidence implicating the CAGE Respondents, in accord with jurisprudence in Hawitt v. Campbell, [1983] CanLi 307 @ paragraph 19, and Slattery (Trustee of) v. Slattery, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 430 (“Slattery”). The order was vigorously opposed by both the CAGE Respondents, CRA counsel, and later AG Canada counsel thereafter, whereas the latter had shown grossly disproportionate resistance to the same. The basis of the April 1st, 2022 discovery order was predicated on sections 241(3) and 222 of the Income Tax Act. Slattery is essential because it sets the context under which ITA 241(3) is to be understood. Iacobucci J., a former Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Minister of Justice, outlines in its preface;

“I agree with the respondent that, in Glover, the proceedings in question had no connection whatsoever with the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act. As a result, this Court's decision must be read to mean that the confidentiality provisions apply to any legal proceeding of a civil character which is not covered by the exception provided in s. 241(3). In other words, ss. 241(1) and (2) apply to civil proceedings which are not related to the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act. In my view, Glover does not inform the issue already set out: the essential question is whether or not the bankruptcy proceedings taken herein are related to the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act. As I will now discuss, I think they are.”

In Part 2 of Slattery, justice Iacobucci outlined the context by which the testimony of CRA Officials may be introduced in Civil proceedings;

“Disclosure of information obtained through tax returns or collected in the course of tax investigations may be necessary during litigation in order to ensure that all relevant information is before the court, and thereby to assist in the correct disposition of litigation. But this necessity is sanctioned by Parliament in a very limited number of situations. Disclosure is authorized in criminal proceedings and other proceedings as set out in s. 241(3). Certain other situations are specified in s. 241(4), which have been described by the Ontario Court of Appeal as being "largely of an administrative nature" (Glover v. Glover (No. 1), supra, at p. 397).”

Iacobucci J. clarified the meaning and context in s. 241(3) with respect to proceedings which are related to the enforcement of the Income Tax Act. By means of this argument, the legal provision concerning the CRA testimony, which was not permitted to unfold, is most certainly provisioned by law. It should furhter be noted that CRA testimony is automatically provisioned with respect to criminal components under subsection 3.1 in the same statute. Justice Iacobucci continues as follows;

“As already noted, s. 241(3) provides, inter alia, that the confidentiality provisions in s. 241(1) and (2) do not apply "in respect of proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of" the Income Tax Act. The appellant argues that the only proceedings covered by this exception are those which are expressly provided for in Part XV of the Act, entitled "Administration and Enforcement". The appellant's argument would require the words in s. 241(3) to be read as meaning that the confidentiality provisions do not apply "in respect of proceedings taken pursuant to the administration or enforcement provisions" of the Income Tax Act. Neither the text nor context of s. 241 supports this argument. The connecting phrases used by Parliament in s. 241(3) are very broad. The confidentiality provisions are stated not to apply in respect of proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act. The phrase "in respect of" was considered by this Court in Nowegijick v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, at p. 39: The words "in respect of" are, in my opinion, words of the widest possible scope. They import such meanings as "in relation to", "with reference to" or "in connection with". The phrase "in respect of" is probably the widest of any expression intended to convey some connection between two related subject matters. [Emphasis added.] In my view, these comments are equally applicable to the phrase "relating to". The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1984) defines the word "relation" as follows: ...what one person or thing has to do with another, way in which one stands or is related to another, kind of connection or correspondence or contrast or feeling that prevails between persons or things... So, both the connecting phrases of s. 241(3) suggest that a wide rather than narrow view should be taken when considering whether a proposed disclosure is in respect of proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of the Income Tax Act.”

By way of the foregoing, ITA 241(3) should be understood as any type of civil proceeding which involves content that CRA Auditors should be reasonably concerned with. This theme is further supported in continued commentary by Iacobucci J. in Slattery;

“The next question to ask considers what type of administration or enforcement proceedings are contemplated by s. 241(3): only proceedings brought under the Income Tax Act itself, or both such proceedings and others? To answer this question, one must look first to the wording of s. 241(3). That provision contains no language which confines the concept of proceedings relating to administration or enforcement to the boundaries of the Income Tax Act. This conclusion is buttressed when one considers the context of s. 241. Section 241 is found in Part XV of the Income Tax Act, which deals with administration and enforcement as previously noted. It is obvious, but the fact must nonetheless be highlighted, that the collection of money owing to Revenue Canada is an important part of the Act's enforcement. This proposition is confirmed by s. 222 of the Act which reads as follows; S. 222: All taxes, interest, penalties, costs and other amounts payable under this Act are debts due to Her Majesty and recoverable as such in the Federal Court of Canada or any other court of competent jurisdiction or in any other manner provided by this Act. [Emphasis added.]"

The former Deputy AG completes the argument in contemplating the requirement in section 222 of the Income Tax Act as follows;

"Section 222 is a clear statement that, in addition to the procedures specified in the Income Tax Act, the Minister may resort generally to the courts to institute civil proceedings to collect taxes as debts. But, in order to take full advantage of this power, the Minister must be able to disclose in court otherwise confidential information in order to prove the cause of action in debt. It must therefore be possible to disclose such information to establish the amount owed and to prove related matters. Absent the ability to disclose as required to prove a debt, s. 222 would be deprived of part of its meaning. The absurdity of such a result strongly suggests that the collection proceedings specified in s. 222 are proceedings "relating to the... enforcement" of the Income Tax Act within the meaning of s. 241(3).”

Mr. Dempsey’s BC court Affidavits, and as likewise shown in the redacted Litigation page exhibits, include sworn statements by the CAGE CEO in his 2021 Settlement Affidavit which clearly invite tax audit and trigger ITA section 222. This concerns two conflicting accounts in the same Affidavit concerning the termination of the CAGE entity's revenue partnership with a technology partner company, and the disposition of former CAGE entity employees as it relates to CSR records, their employment tenure, and sworn statements in paragraph 12 of the same Affidavit.

In Slattery, justice Iacobucci had argued Mr. Dempsey’s right to due diligence via testimony by CRA officials by way of the shareholder evidence presented. Likewise, ITA 241(3.1) is provisioned by way of criminal code violations related to the proceedings, a number of which have directly threatened Mr. Dempsey’s life and well-being, including home invasions forcing relocation from British Columbia to Nova Scotia in February 2022. These discovery rights should be upheld prior to allowing an enforcement of $376,207.97 in costs at the BCSC, and another $41,217.53 from an unfounded BCCA ruling besides related sundries for a grand total of $445,489.50. All of this would occasion irreparable harm, bankrupcy, calumnous court decisions which would be impossible to remedy without correction in a different court, an estate conflict with estranged relatives likewise implicated in criminal mischief (see the zersetzung guide page), and the challenges involved in having to maintain Constitutional rights amid a weaponized bench. Similarly, the hard evidence concerning the Respondents and related criminal actors in this scandal would remain unanswered. The framework evidenced in this scandal is expected to impact numerous other victims in varied capacities.

Egregious Crimes Concerning Cognitive Liberty and Fourth Industrial Revolution ("4IR") Surveillance Tools, and the Constitutional Right to Privacy

4IR Portal [Click]

Section 8 protects persons against unjustified intrusions on their privacy interests (Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 159; R. v. Gomboc, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 at paragraphs 17, 75). As shown in Hunter, the protection of people includes corporations as legal persons. The purpose of section 8 is to prevent unjustified searches before they happen, not simply to determine after the fact whether they ought to have occurred in the first place (Hunter at page 160).

The values underlying the privacy interest protected by section 8 are dignity, integrity and autonomy (R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at page 292). The protection section 8 provides for privacy ― personal, territorial and informational — is essential not only to human dignity, but also to the functioning of our democratic society. As such, section 8 protects a sphere of individual autonomy within which people have the right “to be let alone” and on which the state cannot intrude without permission (R. v. Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11 at paragraph 38). At the same time, section 8 permits reasonable searches and seizures in recognition that the state’s legitimate interest in advancing its goals or enforcing its laws will sometimes require a degree of intrusion into the private sphere (Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), [2015] 3 S.C.R. 250 at paragraph 55).

An unreasonable search contrary to section 8 of the Charter may impact on the protected interests of privacy, and more broadly, human dignity. An unreasonable search that intrudes on an area in which the individual reasonably enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or that demeans their dignity, is more serious than one which does not (Grant, supra, at paragraph 78; Paterson, supra at paragraph 49). It should also be recalled here that a “violation of a person's body is much more serious than that of his office or even of his home” (Pohoretsky, supra at paragraph 5). The search of a personal computer is one of the most intrusive invasions of privacy that can be imagined (R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 at paragraph 105; Reeves, supra, at paragraph 66).

It is well noted that today's rapid advances in technology vastly outpace our legal system. Yet, the fundamental principles in law and the Constitution are immutable. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 at paragraphs 534-538 presents a compelling benchmark concerning the crimes germane to this scandal involving section 8 of the Charter, which detail a Citizen's Constitiutional right to privacy, and as coupled with freedom and liberty as detailed at section 7. The SCC held the following in Wise;

"I think it is clear, given this Court's holdings in R. v. Duarte, 1990 CanLII 150 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, and Wong, supra, that the use of an electronic tracking device is a search within the meaning of the Charter. In Wong, the majority stated, at pp. 43-44, that it would be superfluous to undertake a lengthy analysis into whether surreptitious video surveillance by the state constitutes a search and seizure under s. 8, and added: In Duarte, this Court held that unauthorized electronic audio surveillance violates s. 8 of the Charter. It would be wrong to limit the implications of that decision to that particular technology. Rather what the Court said in Duarte must be held to embrace all existing means by which the agencies of the state can electronically intrude on the privacy of the individual, and any means which technology places at the disposal of law enforcement authorities in the future. [Emphasis added in third sentence.]

That reasoning applies here. It is true that, unlike the audio and video surveillance methods employed in Duarte and Wong, the tracking device reveals only the whereabouts of an individual, and does not extend to the interception and recording of private communications. It would be surprising, however, if the ambit of the Charter's protection did not extend to this area. An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy not only in the communications he makes, but in his movements as well. Indeed, this proposition was clearly enunciated in Wong, supra, at p. 47, in the following passage:

George Orwell in his classic dystopian novel 1984 paints a grim picture of a society whose citizens had every reason to expect that their every movement was subject to electronic video surveillance. The contrast with the expectations of privacy in a free society such as our own could not be more striking. [Emphasis added.]

The underlying rationale for this approach has been well stated by Professor Melvin Gutterman in his article "A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance" (1988), 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 647, in the following passage, at p. 706: In a variety of public contexts, we may expect to be casually observed, but may justifiably be outraged by intensive scrutiny. In these public acts we do not expect to be personally identified and subject to extensive surveillance, but seek to merge into the "situational landscape." The ability to move about freely without constant supervision by the government is an important source of individual liberty that must be addressed. A fear of systematic observation, even in public places, destroys this sense of freedom. Justice Douglas recognized the importance of this privacy value in a democratic society, commenting that free movement is as dangerous to a tyrant as free expression of ideas or the right of assembly and is, therefore, controlled in most countries. I must confess to finding it absolutely outrageous that in a free society the police or other agents of the state should have it within their power, at their sole discretion and on the basis of mere suspicion, to attach a beeper on a person's car that permits them to follow his or her movements night and day for extended periods."

Sheridan et al., 2020, as shown in the zersetzung guide page, had gleaned its initial study group from over twenty million online citations concerning sophisticated gangstalking believed to be sponsored by governments. This dataset was then vigoriously parsed against measurable criterion used in the study. Sheridan's conclusion stated that organized criminal mischief, often associated with modalities of electronic harassment and/or surveillance, was a "widespread phenomenon that has been subject to little scientific examination". In an event this scandal were to become the first bona-fide case dealing with crimes involving cognitive liberty and 4IR technologies, it would most certainly not be the last. Likewise, a framework capable of shaping the conduct of five courts and three police agencies in three provinces, that is likewise supported through criminal mischief, was not developed for the sake of defending the interests of one federally-sponsored CAGE CEO who decided to commit retaliatory hate crimes in the wake of a shareholder dispute. This is a much more comprehensive and compelling public issue.

The Q/A II page on this website, in conjunction with the Testimony page and those accessible via the 4IR Portal, can assist investigators in understanding 4IR and the manner in which it is espoused by policymakers, foresight groups, and think-tanks in Canada's political sphere. Likewise, investigators must learn what these tools are capable of, if they are not already aware.

Per the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24) [link], the crimes associated with this scandal carry penalties of life imprisonment in Canada.

Incarceration & Duty Counsel

Jailed [Click]

Per the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 10: Everyone has the right on arrest or detention;

a) To be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;

b) To retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and

c) To have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.

Note: No distinction is made with respect to the distinction between civil and criminal law; the statute is triggered upon the loss of a Citizen's liberty.

Per the account in the Jailed page, I was denied access to legal counsel, as was the case since November 2021, in the wake of the 2021 CAGE dispute. Acts concerning the role and requirements of Duty Counsel explore a Citizen's entitlement to aid with respect to matters germane to the effects of this scandal.

Per CHAPTER 252 OF THE REVISED STATUTES, 1989 amended 1999 (2nd Sess.), c. 8, s. 8; 2020, c. 15 (except s. 2(5)) concerning entitlement to legal aid and powers of a lawyer;

15 (1) The Commission may grant legal aid in any area of law involving the liberty or civil rights of an individual and for matters involving the integrity and protection of an individual’s family, including;

a) Criminal law;

b) Family law;

c) Social justice or administrative matters, if the matter affects the individual’s income,

housing, entitlement to benefits, ability to earn a livelihood, family integrity or mental

health; and

d) Any other matter as directed by the Attorney General.

While incarcerated during August 2024, a teary-eyed prison support rep for the Duty Counsel agency advised that her head office was unwilling to consider the characteristics of the scandal in refusing to assign a lawyer under section 15(1)(c) of the foregoing Act, likewise irrespective of section 10 of the Constitution Act. It should likewise be noted that, per the account at the Litigation page, counsel for the Provincial Attorney General's office had acted as an "interested observer" (ie., a chaperone) in support of the CAGE during cost enforcement hearings.

The Basis of Canadian Law

As was first contemplated by Plato, the basis of law and social contract follows a consensus in metaphysics. In other words, an overarching perspective one might have concerning ontology (ie., the structure of reality, or the universe, if you prefer). Magna Carta, the Charter of John Locke, and Canada's Constitution Act rely on a Judeo-Christian foundation of metaphysics. In other words, the tenets of moral and natural law are issued by God, which likewise inform the characteristics of a social contract governed by law. Canada's highest court reiterated the Constitution Act, 1982 in Ruffo v. Conseil de la magistrature, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 267 at paragraph 37;

"Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law"

Contemporary postmodern jurists, politicians, and lawmakers reject the foregoing along with the possibility of absolute truths (which ironically, occasions an absolute). Alternatively, they may suggest that frameworks of natural law are non-binding because they can only be grasped in part. Irrefutable inferences such as intelligent design are often rejected. Those under the same assumptions reject Immanuel Kant’s astute observation that reason must make room for faith, without offering an alternative beyond glib inspirations. The primary characteristic of the distinction between Canada's Constitutional foundation and postmodern assumptions is that the latter would assert that metaphysics and the natural law that stems from it can be re-written. At its most basic expression, the postmodern movement is a species of anarchy. When the basis of law is decoupled from its transcendental source, its object becomes subject to social darwinism and the prejudicial interests of persons, groups, and governments. The concern is exacerbated through advances in technology. This is why whistleblowing is so crucially important in our time. In some cases, a rejection of legal precedent can render the law unknowable.

"I'm not sure that I would be comfortable thinking that judges should be advancing the law with a social agenda in mind. It seems to me that the social agenda is the agenda for Parliament and if Parliament wants to advance the law in social terms, that's their job."

The Honourable Marshall Rothstein, Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice